lawyers
6 miss the necessary tools to apprehend, study, and conceptualise the transformation of social reality into a posited rule having the power of law. In spite of ignorance about the "inner" mechanisms of custom, why and how it becomes law, it may be presumed that its twofold strands operate in a circular fashion of constant interaction. 7 Custom is a legal obligation because it is practiced in society; likewise, it is social reality because the members of the society conceive it, and implement it as law. As such, custom remains to be unceasingly re-confirmed and re-constructed. 8 Still, to this day, there exist more questions about custom than answers. Our lack of knowledge extends beyond the psychological (highly subjective) element. That a practice is empirically observable means nothing without definitions, rules and delimitations regarding the types of social conduct accounting for customary practice.
Hence, scholarly understanding of custom is varied, expanding from the announcement of its death 9 to its "resurrection" as a new custom that primarily relies 6 Other disciplines within social science may have more pertinent tools in that respect. See for instance J. upon opinio juris. 10 It is not within the scope of this paper to address any of these questions. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, the accent is moved away from what is seen as the archetype of international customary practice, namely state practice. Instead, emphasis is given to another actor, whose practice customary theory often reproduces, albeit in a rather uncritical manner. This paper discusses the role and the significance of one particular facet of that practice, which the editors of this volume refer to as interpretive communities, namely international courts and their judges. In that respect, this paper suggests two arguments.
First, scholarship has extensively debated the methods 11 international courts shall apply to identify the existence of international custom, which they then interpret with the view to give customary rules effect within the context of a dispute or a legal question. However, little attention has been paid to the fact that, while identifying custom, courts and judges (re-)define custom as a source of international law. Thus, through custom identification, courts hold the master key to the definition of custom.
Second, de facto, judges and courts have the authority to act as a substitute to the absence of formalism in custom making. By recognising the validity of customary rules they catalytically contribute to the customary process. These two arguments are developed in paragraphs 2 and 3 respectively of the paper. Paragraph 4 concludes and links the paper's analysis to the framework suggested by the book's editors in their introductive note.
Custom as a matrix, and the role of judges and courts
Custom consists of an inherent duality split between the rule, namely, the normative output of the customary process and, secondly, the process itself, which corresponds to one of the two primary sources of international law.
12 Obviously, this is yet another dyad characterising that concept. What is less obvious though is that courts occupy a privileged place in that process that allows them to interpret and, thereby, (re-)define the latter dimension of custom -that is, custom as a source, corresponding to what the title of this paper calls a "matrix".
In simpler terms, the definition of custom (and its qualification) as a source of international law is a norm/rule 13 (the two terms being used interchangeably in the However, interpretation is by definition subjective; it depends on the theoretical (but also the highly ideological, as will be claimed below) premises of courts and the prevailing judicial majorities within them. Hence, an absence of a single definition of custom should not be surprising. One may wonder if, beyond the minimalistic conception of the two customary elements (which, as it will be shown, is challenged by courts), there is one single definition of custom as a source or a variety of perceptions of it. The following examples, which, for reasons of consistency andgiven the limited scope of the paper -brevity, are in principle taken from the practice of the ICJ, are quite illustrative of the existence of diverse perceptions of custom.
What is custom after all?
Opinio juris is obscure in that it is difficult to be empirically observed and evidenced. 16 
The role of ideology in custom making
One may see in these passages a fragmentation of law, consisting in the present instance of inconsistencies surrounding a "systemic" rule of the international legal order that defines how rules of general international law are created. Instead of fragmentation, another perspective would deem the term of evolution more appropriate when tracing the definition of custom by the ICJ. One could, finally, envisage a more moderate approach highlighting the difference in the context 25 of each particular case that invited the Court to elaborate on the applicable criteria for the recognition of the existence of customary rules. Nevertheless, the terms one may choose to characterise the case law at issue are of little importance for this paper.
Arguably, the lack of consistency and clarity regarding the definition of custom does not favour legal certainty -which, especially in the case of an informal source such as custom that establishes non-written rules, which, ipso facto, fail to satisfy the exigencies of legal certainty, is of essence. However, what truly matters for the purposes of this paper, and what the examples given above strive to aid in demonstrating is how courts and judges define the matrix of custom. That is, how, through the means of interpretation for the purposes of law identification, courts define/set/interpret the conditions for custom to deliver normative outputs.
Acknowledging the power courts have to shape the matrix of custom invites us to also accept that, as this is achieved by means of interpretation, and because interpretation is inherently subjective, that matrix is exposed to and may even be consequently dependent on the ideological preferences of the "key holders" i.e. courts and their judges. What distinguishes a judge from a scholar, or any other actor involved in the interpretation of a rule, is that the former is given the authority 26 to turn her/his subjective interpretation into a legally binding judicial decision -which is principally compulsory for the parties to a dispute, but also develops a broader interpretative effect 27 as an auxiliary tool for the determination of international law. 28 Unlike scholars, judges and courts are bestowed with a "stamp" signifying their power/competence/authority to deliver justice based on rules accepted as valid within a given legal system and its constitutive society. However, just like scholars, judges also interpret those rules (and the rules used to found other rules, that is, the rules on the sources of the law) on the basis of their subjective preferences and understanding of the law, its scope and material sources (i.e. the extra-legal rationale behind a rule).
Be they impartial, judges still see law and the facts behind it from their own, subjective perspective. They do not adjudicate in a vacuum; they carry to the bench their personal system of values and ideology, their personal understanding of what law is or ought to be, and they evaluate and assess the law the way they perceive it through the lens of their personal experience in life. Hence, the power of judges to impact on the definition of custom is of particular importance when it reveals certain ideological preferences.
In Lotus, for instance, the ICJ's predecessor, the PCIJ, clearly linked custom to the will of states. In the two sets of juxtaposed passages it is not difficult to identify, apart from the differences in the definition of custom by the respective Courts, the diametrically opposite theoretical premises that underpin these definitions. These foundations correspond in fact to two different theoretical (but also highly ideological)
conceptions of international law. The first understands international law as solely emanating from state volonté. 35 Namely, that the normative power of the law stems from the sovereign will of states. Consequently, customary law is perceived as the product of that sovereign will. Thus, the voluntarist/étatiste view of international law regards custom as a tacit agreement. 36 Thereby, it emphasises state sovereignty and promulgates the notion that no rule can validly exist without the consent, or against the will of the sovereign state. It is working from within this mindset that the Lotus presumption acquires its full meaning. Because international law is not binding upon states unless they agree to it, everything not prohibited is deemed to be allowed. The second school of thought squarely rejects state will as the foundation of the normative power of international law -whereas in its more extreme expressions it rejects the idea of state sovereignty altogether. 37 The sociological objectivist reading of international law accepts that obligations reflecting the needs of the society be imposed without, or even against, the will of states. 38 Ultimately, it is social necessity,
and not the voluntas of sovereigns, that gives international law its legal force. The critical evaluation of these two theoretical approaches escapes the limited scope of this paper. Suffice it to remind that the struggle between apologetic, on the one hand, and utopian, on the other, approaches to international law is ongoing -being in a sense inherent to that legal system. Thus, international law vacillates between these two theoretical, but equally ideological extremes. These can effortlessly be discerned behind the examples regarding the definition of custom given earlier in the paper. Interestingly, in the hands of courts and judges -who have the power to identify custom, and thereby, as 40 As above at 38, Scelle, Cours de droit, Les cours de Droit, Paris, pp. 10-11. 41 already demonstrated, define it too -these theories also acquire a normative dimension. In the present instance, the term normative implies both what the law ought to be, and what it is as a norm -the content and force of which is recognised by a court. Regarding the former dimension of the term normative in the present instance, any theory aspiring to provide an answer to the "existential" question of what endows a rule (especially a non-written one) with legal force cannot be but normative in the sense that (among other reasons), for rules to acquire the power of law, they ought to meet the requirements of the theory. Theories set the framework, and law cannot be law, unless it fits that framework. Finally, regarding the latter use of the term, when these theories are applied by courts and judges, because of the authority these actors have to identify the law, ought becomes is. Thus far, this paper has argued that judges and courts, while establishing the existence of (i.e. identifying) a customary rule, and through judicial interpretation, define what custom is as a source/matrix of international law intended to generate customary rules. What follows aims at discussing another dimension of the role of judicial function, this time not with regard to the definition of custom, but to its normative outputs, that is, the customary norms/rules. What (inter alia) distinguishes custom from the other big source of international law, namely treaties, is that the latter are formalised. Unlike treaties, where, for them to be valid, certain pre-agreed procedures and formal requirements need to be met, custom is in essence informal.
48 This is why it is described as a process and not a procedure. 49 That being said, the second argument defended in this paper is that, de facto, by recognising in their decisions the validity of customary rules they identify, courts and judges act as a substitute to the absence of formalism in international custom making. Consequently, they allow customary rules to obtain an objective content.
No matter whether custom is binding because of the will of states, or because it reflects societal values translated in legal necessity, its pivotal characteristic remains in that the subjects (that is, in principle, states) that partake as members of the . 51 As opposed to treaties that only have an inter-subjective or relative effect that precludes them from creating obligations against non-signatory parties subjective belief/conviction of each state regarding its existence and content. 52 The contrast between the objective nature of the normative output and its subjective origins is sonorous. In the absence of an extraneous to the customary process agent, that is to say, a "third" actor, whose standpoint would differ from that of all other involved in the customary process actors, the normative output of that process can hardly be a unique, common to all conception of the customary rule. Consequently, because of the lack of formalism and the non-written nature of custom, rather than one, single, objective normative output, there are varied, subjective, and fragmented perceptions of it, corresponding to the respective understanding (or even interests) of each state or other involved actor.
According to the argument defended in the paper, de facto, judges and courts cover that "gap". 53 Every time they have to come up with an answer to a dispute or a legal question, they are required to reach their outcome using the law (in the way they so interpret it). When that law is nebulous regarding its content or legal validity, as custom is, judicial function involves -apart from determining the concrete effect that should be given to the rule 54 -a process of legal identification. Thereby, judges and courts exercise authority and recognise the existence and the content of a customary rule. By doing so, they recognise its legal validity too. 55 This allows them to rely on it courts and judges, could be seen as a de facto substitute to the informal nature of custom and to the lack of certainty that this entails. 56 This is relevant also to what Hart has described as the absence of a rule of recognition in the international legal order. 57 International courts, having the authority to juris dicere, which is what jurisdiction literally means, exercise that authority to formally recognise custom as valid, posited international law. Thereby, they allow custom to acquire one single, objective content, irrespective of the subjective understanding states may have of it. Besides, the Hartian rule of recognition is not a necessary precondition for the normative force of positive law. 58 It is merely a luxury that can only be found in advanced socio-legal systems.
59
"In the simpler form of society", as the international one is, "we must wait and see whether a rule gets accepted as a rule or not"
60
.
The role of courts in that instance is to validate that acceptance. "When the courts use [customary rules], and make orders in accordance with them which are enforced, then for the first time these rules receive legal recognition". 61 here that judges are only given the authority 64 to recognise law -not to create it.
Custom is elaborated within and by the society through rather informal pathways;
then it is recognised as valid law. 65 This is not acceptable in developed legal systems that contain centralised institutions, formalised law making channels and rules of recognition. However, it is fine for the less advanced, and highly decentralised order of international law whose systemic features make it necessary that courts recognise the validity of custom. Does that make judges and courts part of the customary process? The answer to that question is that this might not be as innocent a question as it prima facie looks. For, answering it entails suggesting whether the definition of custom, its fait créateur, 66 shall encompass judicial recognition, 67 and whether such recognition shall have a declarative or a constitutive effect. However, this would contradict that paper's very aspiration to limit its analysis to observation, and abstain from making any claims that might comprise a normative dimension. Suffice it to suggest here that, even if courts and judges do not construct the content of the customary rule, they may impact on and allegedly (co-)construct the definition of custom as a source of law that generates customary rules. Thus, judges might affect the customary rule to the extent that the matrix (i.e. custom as a source of law) matters for it and its validity.
international law. Positivism requires the law to be posited through formalised channels; 70 allegedly, this guarantees neutrality. The argument suggested in the paper is that custom is indeed a social construct, that is, it is posited, although it is not constructed in a way that fully satisfies the exigencies of legal positivism, whereas its identification is definitely not as ideologically neutral as positivism pretends to be.
There are some very obvious traits of custom that lend to its departure from the standards of legal positivism. Mainly, this is in essence informal; by no means does it custom is bound to be something "less" than objective law; it is destined to depend on the subjective understanding and conceptions states may have of it. Indeed, it is states that co-form, interpret and apply custom, and of course they do so based on their individual, subjective and, by definition, also fragmented and partial vision of a particular social reality, which they see as transformed into allegedly objective law.
Instead of one objective customary rule, there are various conceptions of it and this applies with regard to both its normative force and its content.
That very oxymoron, namely the subjective nature of a law proclaiming objectivity, is inherent to international law and its decentralised structure. This is why the paper pointed to the role of international judges and courts, who are conceived here as a de facto substitute to the absence of formalism and of agents having the power to identify and objectively recognise the validity of custom as law.
As already mentioned, jurisdiction means juris dicere; this reflects Montesquieu's idea of the function of the judiciary as "bouche de la loi". Judges are expected to tell what the law is and not to create it. However, the line separating law making from interpretation may be proven to be fine. This is the case of the innately informal international custom. Judges are given the authority to formally recognise the existence (i.e. legal validity) of a customary rule. In doing so, the paper argues, they are covering the absence in international law of the Hartian rule of recognition. This is what makes them a substitute to the deficiencies of the international legal system. In the absence of a rule of recognition, we resort to agents, such as international courts, which have the authority to juris dicere.
The other main argument suggested in the paper relates to the power of judges and courts to define custom. As such, the definition of custom as a source of international law is a rule. By identifying customary rules (i.e. the normative product of the customary process, that is, a custom-rule) judges also (re-)define custom as a "matrix" (i.e. the process leading to the customary rule, that is, custom-source). Thereby, they may be also proven to be influencing the content of the normative output of that source, namely the customary rule. This is where (positivist) observation is of importance. The brief overview of the definition of custom before primarily the ICJ attempted to demonstrate that judicial definition of custom as a matrix vacillates between two ideological (and, therefore, highly political too) extremes: voluntarism, which corresponds to a theory of international legal positivism that identifies state will as the basis for the normative force of international law, and its adversary (but equally positivist) theory, sociological objectivism, which explains the force of law on the basis of social necessity instead of the sovereign will of the state, which, in that case, is expected to decline, giving space to what is seen (also by judges) as necessary in and for the society.
The first set of conclusions to be reached is that, without judicial confirmation of the existence of the customary rule, there is no legal certainty, whereas the very existence of the rule might ultimately depend on the definition of custom judges and courts
give. Be it custom a social construct, that is, a product of the international community (of states 71 ), its fate is concomitant with the judicial function. For, it is courts and judges (or other agents having the authority to tell what the law is, such as the ILC) who formally recognise the legal validity of the customary process, but also interpret its matrix, thereby defining what custom is. Yet, neither judges, nor their definition of the customary matrix are neutral -as legal positivism claims custom to be. Indeed, it could be argued -admittedly, not without a touch of provocation -that positivism is not as hostile to the subjective spirit of post-modernism as one would think.
The second set of conclusions refers to the idea of the power of legality found on the basis of this collective volume. The paper attempted to show that, indeed, there is space for legality beyond the formalistic constraints of positivism, which appears in its very basis to be far from immune to ideological preferences and, more generally, to extra-legal assumptions and aspirations. Recently, the ILC added international custom to its agenda. 72 Its work is expected to contribute to the building of a more concrete and solid understanding of custom, its identification and definitionrestricting, thereby, the margin of discretion judges and courts enjoy in that respect.
However, custom will remain as informal in its nature as it has always been. Legality -especially where formalism is absent -is constructed by the practice of interpretative communities. Thus, the paper confirms the first heuristic suggested by the book editors. Judges, the ILC, but also the International Law Association, the Institut de droit international and, more generally, scholarship, including this paper, are interpreting custom -and the interpretation of it other interpreters made. The only difference being that, within the system of international law, formally speaking, not all of these interpretive actors exercise the same degree of authority. Thus, to paraphrase the well-known saying from the Animal Farm, within this community of interpreters, all interpreters are equal in the contribution their practice makes to custom making, but some are more equal than others. 71 Cf., for instance, C. 
